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Abstract. Estimation, inference and interpretation of the causal effects of programs and
policies have all advanced dramatically over the past 25 years. We highlight three particu-
larly important intellectual trends: an improved appreciation of the substantive importance
of heterogeneous responses and of their methodological implications, a stronger focus on
internal validity brought about by the “credibility revolution,” and the scientific value
that follows from grounding estimation and interpretation in economic theory. We discuss
a menu of commonly employed partial equilibrium approaches to the identification of
causal effects, emphasizing that the researcher’s central intellectual contribution always
consists of making an explicit case for a specific causal interpretation given the relevant
economic theory, the data, the institutional context and the economic question of inter-
est. We also touch on the importance of general equilibrium effects and full cost–benefit
analyses.
Résumé. Point de vue: Sur l’estimation des effets causatifs des politiques et programmes.
Dans le monde de l’estimation, l’inférence et l’interprétation des effets causatifs des pro-
grammes et des politiques, il y a eu des progrès dramatiques au cours des derniers 25
ans. Les auteurs soulignent trois tendances intellectuelles particulièrement importantes :
une appréciation améliorée de l’importance substantielle des réponses hétérogènes et de
leur importance méthodologique, une focalisation plus robuste sur la validité interne
engendrée par la « révolution de la crédibilité », et la valeur scientifique qui découle
d’un ancrage de l’estimation et de l’interprétation dans la théorie économique. On discute
un éventail d’approches d’équilibre partiel à l’identification des effets causatifs, mettant
au premier plan que la contribution intellectuelle centrale du chercheur consiste à bâtir
un argumentaire explicite pour une interprétation causale spécifique compte tenu de la
théorie économique pertinente, des données, du contexte institutionnel, et de la question
économique d’intérêt. On mentionne aussi l’importance des effets d’équilibre général et
des analyses de tous les coûts et avantages.
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1. Introduction
Methods for estimating, making inferences about and interpreting the causal ef-
fects of programs and policies have advanced dramatically over the past 25 years.
This paper briefly reviews and comments on these developments, with an empha-
sis on issues we think have received insufficient attention in other discussions.1
Three major intellectual trends within applied economics frame our discus-
sion. The first is serious consideration of heterogeneity in responses to programs
and policies, which we consider in section 2. Heterogeneous responses arise for
many reasons, including the common and prosaic practice of reducing hetero-
geneous programs and policies to binary indicator variables. In the “essential
heterogeneity” world of Heckman (2001), agents and gatekeepers make policy
and program participation choices in light of (perhaps quite limited) knowledge
of heterogeneous responses. Throughout the paper we consider the implications
of heterogeneous responses for the identification, estimation and interpretation
of estimated causal effects.
The second trend is the “credibility revolution,” which seeks to increase the in-
ternal validity of estimates of program and policy effects via reliance on carefully
considered identification strategies. This revolution encompasses both the very
rapid increase in the use of social and field experiments as well as the increase in
attention to the sources of exogenous variation employed in techniques such as
instrumental variables. More broadly, it embodies a greater emphasis on internal
validity relative to other concerns. Works such as Angrist and Pischke (2009),
Rubin (2008) and Imbens (2010) embody the credibility revolution worldview.
The third trend is the intellectual revival of “structural” methods. Loosely
speaking, applying the structural approach means writing down an explicit eco-
nomic model and estimating (or sometimes calibrating) the parameters of the
model. The formal model facilitates interpretation and, to the extent that it
achieves the goal of plausible policy invariance, provides a theoretically grounded
approach to consideration of policies not present in the data. This revival has
many sources: in part it represents a reaction against the excesses of the cred-
ibility revolution.2 It also reflects improvements in computing technology that
allow the estimation of more sophisticated structural models as well as concep-
tual developments related to estimation, interpretation and the incorporation of
heterogeneity. The new wave of structural research also responds positively to
the credibility revolution via closer attention to sources of identification, be they
model-based (i.e., largely dependent upon economic theory and/or functional
1 We oversample examples from the labour economics, health economics and economics of
education literatures, as we know these literatures best. However, the underlying issues know no
subfield boundaries. We do not delve deeply into technical econometrics; instead, we point
readers to the many excellent books and reviews that cover that material, such as Abbring and
Heckman (2007), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a, b), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Imbens
and Rubin (2015). Finally, we do not address Bayesian approaches.
2 One of us fondly recalls initiating the following exchange at a conference: Question: “What
model could explain your results?” Answer: “We think of our paper as a theory-free zone.”
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form assumptions) and/or design-based (i.e., largely based on a—potentially the-
oretically motivated—research design involving exogenous variation). Heckman
(2001, 2005, 2010) makes the intellectual case for the modern structural view.3
We view heterogeneous treatment effects as obvious and long overdue, and we
view strong and explicitly defended identification as a complement to, rather than
a substitute for, interpretation based on coherent economic frameworks. This
does not mean that every paper must have a structural, or even a formal, model.
Full-blown structural models require specific expertise and consume a great deal
of research time and should be subjected to ex ante intellectual cost–benefit tests.
Moreover, economists have certain theories about the value of the division of
labour. We therefore see the approaches as complements at the disciplinary level
and so resist calls for every empirical economist to become a part-time producer
of formal theory. Further, we strongly reject the view that economists should
not bother trying to answer questions for which the extant data and institutions
provide no strong design-based identification. Instead, we argue that economists
should try to operate at the frontier in a space defined by the credibility of iden-
tification and the substantive importance of the topic and should recognize that
quality of evidence takes a continuous rather than a binary form.4
Section 3 lays out our viewpoint (as promised in the title!) regarding the
implications of these three complementary trends for the practice of program
and policy evaluation by economists. To do so, it marches through the stan-
dard toolkit of partial equilibrium applied econometric identification strategies—
randomization, conditional independence (a.k.a. “selection on observed vari-
ables”), instrumental variables, bias stability (a.k.a. “natural experiments”) and
regression discontinuity—describing the substantive implications of each class
of assumptions for estimation and interpretation and discussing how to make an
explicit case for a specific causal interpretation given the economic theory, the
data, the institutional context and the evaluation question of interest. We view the
making of such substantive cases as the primary intellectual task of the empirical
researcher seeking to make causal claims.
Section 4 considers two related alternative views of recent developments that
focus solely on design-based approaches: hierarchies of evidence and “magic bul-
let” theories regarding particular estimators. These views attempt to take an epis-
temological shortcut around the hard work of making a compelling case relevant
to a particular evaluation context. We argue for rejecting these views. Sections 5
and 6 consider equilibrium effects and cost–benefit analyses, respectively. These
two topics nicely illustrate our broader point regarding the complementary nature
of credible design-based identification and economic theory. Section 6 concludes.
3 The structural crowd has its excesses as well, such as zealous arguments for the proposition that
a probit model is in some meaningful sense more structural than a linear probability model. We
also view the “Type I Extreme Value is the New Normal” T-shirt through the lens of Goldberger
(1983).
4 Although we focus on causality here, we recognize the value of empirical research that focuses
on (sometimes sophisticated conditional) covariances, trends over time and the like;
“descriptive” (that is, explicitly non-causal) should not be a derisive term in empirical research.
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2. Parameters of interest
The standard potential outcomes framework provides a valuable way in which
to think about causal parameters of interest. To begin, define two outcomes and
a treatment indicator:
Y1i denotes the outcome for unit “i” with treatment
Y0i denotes the outcome for unit “i” without treatment
Ti ∈{0, 1} indicates treatment status for unit “i”
We limit ourselves to binary treatments for simplicity. The general case of
discrete multi-valued treatments follows easily (sometimes); the still more gen-
eral case of continuous treatments can add non-trivial complications. Because a
given unit can experience only one of the two outcomes, we have the observation
equation:
Yi =TiY1i + (1−Ti)Y0i ,
where Yi denotes the observed outcome for unit “i”. Following the literature, and
to emphasize the generality of the framework, we use “units” as a generic term
for participants and “non-participants” to emphasize that programs may serve,
say, individuals, firms or local governments. We use “treatment” as a generic term
for programs and policies. Two other bits of notation will prove useful later on:
let Xi denote a vector of exogenous conditioning variables (but see the discussion
at footnote 10) and let Zi denote a variable that induces exogenous variation in
treatment status.
For treated units, we observe the treated outcome while the untreated outcome
remains counterfactual. For the untreated units, we observe the untreated out-
come while the treated outcome remains counterfactual. The difference between
the treated outcome and the untreated outcome defines the always-unobserved
treatment (or “causal”) effect for each unit:
±i =Y1i −Y0i
Up to this point, we have implicitly interpreted the potential outcome of one unit
as unaffected by the treatment status of other units. The literature calls this the
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which is closely allied to
what economists term partial equilibrium. We relax this assumption, which rules
out general equilibrium effects, in section 5.
The literature focuses on particular averages of ±i , where the choice of which
average depends on the academic or policy question of interest, subject to con-
straints following from the identification strategy and the data that we discuss
in section 3. The most common causal estimand is the Average Treatment Effect
on the Treated (ATET, or sometimes TT or TOT), given by ATET=E(Y1 −Y0|
T =1); we suppress the “i” subscript inside the expectations operator both here
and elsewhere. This parameter informs a cost–benefit analysis that addresses the
question of whether to keep or scrap a program in its present form. Another
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common estimand is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), defined as ATE =
E(Y1 − Y0). The ATE equals the expected impact in the entire population of
eligible units, whether or not they actually participate. This parameter informs a
cost–benefit analysis that considers a mandatory program.
For voluntary programs, impacts at the margin of participation inform cost–
benefit analyses regarding marginal expansions or contractions in the number of
units treated. The definition of marginal will depend on the program context: it
might represent volunteers close to indifferent between participating and not, or
it may represent participants on the margin of selection by a caseworker or other
gatekeeper. Particular sources of exogenous variation in participation, Z, each
define their own set of marginal units that are associated with parameters such as
the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) and the Marginal Treatment Effect
(MTE), as we discuss in section 3.3.
The marginal distributions of outcomes F (Y1i) and F (Y0i) suffice to identify all
of the treatment effect parameters considered so far. Another class of parameters
of interest requires the joint distribution F (Y1i , Y0i). These include the impact
variance, var(±i)=var(Y1i −Y0i), and the fraction of units with a positive impact,
Pr(±i > 0). Identification of these parameters requires assumptions even in the
presence of experimental data, because experimental data provide only the two
marginal distributions, not the link between them implicit in the joint distribution.
Because this class of parameters has received (too) little attention in applied work,
we do not discuss it further but instead refer the interested reader to Djebbari
and Smith (2008).
2.1. A simple Roy-inspired model
Consider a very simple model inspired by Roy (1951) and by the models in Heck-
man et al. (1999) and Barnow and Smith (2016). It adds to the potential out-
comes framework a direct cost of treatment, call it Ci , which may include money
costs, time costs and psychic costs of treatment that may be positive or negative.
Assume, for the moment, that units maximize by choosing to participate when
Y1i −Ci > Y0i .
This simple model embodies three different types of non-random selection.
First, holding Y1iand Ci fixed, units with high values of Y0i do not participate and
units with low values of Y0i do participate; in many contexts, this represents units
with a high opportunity cost declining to participate. Back in the dinosaur days of
the common effect model, in which Y1i −Y0i = ±, a constant for all “i”, selection
on the untreated outcome represented the primary source of applied econometric
concern as in the classical bivariate normal selection model studied by Heckman
(1979). Second, holding Ci fixed, we observe selection on the treatment effectY1i −
Y0i whereby units with high impacts select into treatment. Björklund and Moffitt
(1987) add selection based on the magnitude of the individual-specific impact
to the bivariate normal model.5 Third, holding the potential outcomes fixed, we
expect selection into the program based on Ci as units with low costs select into
5 Blundell et al. (2005) provide an especially clear explication and application.
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the program. As discussed in section 3.3, many instrumental variables analyses
rely on cost-based instruments.
As much as anything, this simple Roy-inspired model points to the limitations
of much research that focuses on estimating causal impacts. Standard economic
models assume that choices depend not on potential outcomes but on the expected
utility associated with those outcomes; that expected utility typically depends on
both the outcomes studied and on other, unmeasured, outcomes. Similarly, the
costs perceived by units pondering treatment will likely include components, such
as psychic costs, not available to the evaluator. Even ordering the magnitudes of
the various causal estimands requires assumptions regarding the correlations
between Y0i , Y1i and Ci . For example, consider the simple (but often empirically
implausible) assumption of independence of costs from potential outcomes. In
this case, we have ATET > ATE due to positive selection on impacts; in other
words, the average treatment effect on the treated exceeds the average treatment
effect in the population. Similarly, ATNT < ATE, where ATNT equals the average
treatment effect among the non-treated, due to selection out of treatment by those
with relatively low treatment effects. Finally, ATE < MATE < ATET, where
MATE, the Marginal Average Treatment Effect, corresponds to individuals just
indifferent to participation, i.e., with Ci ≈Y1i −Y0i , whereas the ATET includes
inframarginal participants whose treatment effect puts them far from the margin
of indifference.
2.2. Parameters of interest compared to the naı̈ve difference in treated and untreated
group means
For the non-experimental case, consider estimation of the ATET, and then the
ATE, in terms of: (i) the naı̈ve expected mean difference between the observed
treated outcome for the treated and the observed untreated outcome for the un-
treated, that is E(Y1|T =1)−E(Y0|T =0), and (ii) various bias and/or selection
terms. Start by writing:
ATET=E(Y1 −Y0|T =1)=E(Y1|T =1)−E(Y0|T =1).
Experiments produce E(Y0|T = 1) by randomly forcing would-be T = 1units to
experience the untreated outcome, subject to various caveats that we discuss in
section 3.1. To see the non-experimental case, add and subtract E(Y0|T = 0) to
yield:
ATET= [E(Y1|T =1)−E(Y0|T =0)]− [E(Y0|T =1)−E(Y0|T =0)].
The first term on the right-hand side is the population analogue of the naı̈ve
non-experimental mean difference estimator, while the second term consists of
the expected difference in untreated outcomes between the participants and non-
participants. This equation clearly illustrates the intuition from our Roy-inspired
model that selection on the untreated outcome likely biases naı̈ve comparisons
of participant and non-participant outcomes. In particular, with costs indepen-
dent of potential outcomes, the simple model predicts negative selection into
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treatment based onY0, which implies a downward bias in the estimated treat-
ment effect. A vast warehouse of evidence indicates that such selection matters
in many contexts. The non-experimental identification strategies we discuss in
sections 3.2 to 3.5 obtain estimates of the expected counterfactual outcome via
econometric manipulation of the untreated units that removes such bias under
specific assumptions.
Now, inspired by Heckman (1996a), contrast the naı̈ve non-experimental
mean difference to the ATE rather than the ATET. Extending the notation, let
E(V1|T = j) = E(Y1|T = j) − E(Y1) denote the difference between the expected
treated outcome among the treated (j = 1) or the untreated (j = 0) and the ex-
pected treated outcome in the population with E(V0|T = j) defined in the same
way for the untreated outcome. We can interpret V as a residual of sorts. Then
write the ATE in terms of the naı̈ve non-experimental observed mean difference
as:
ATE=E(Y1)−E(Y0)= [E(Y1|T =1)−E(Y0|T =0)]− [E(V1|T =1)
−E(V0|T =0)].
Then, adding and subtracting E(V0|T =1)=E(Y0|T =1)−E(Y0) and manipu-
lating yields:
ATE=E(Y1)−E(Y0)= [E(Y1|T =1)−E(Y0|T =0)]−E(V1 −V0|T =1)
− [E(V0|T =1)−E(V0|T =0)].
The ATE thus equals the naı̈ve non-experimental mean difference plus two se-
lection terms. The middle right-hand-side term captures selection into treatment
based on the magnitude of the treatment effect. The rightmost term, in square
brackets, captures selection into treatment based on the difference in the mean
deviations between the population and the group-specific untreated outcomes.
The Roy-inspired model with costs independent of impacts implies a positive
value for the second term and a negative value for the third term, which means
that the simple model does not sign the bias associated with using the naı̈ve
non-experimental mean difference to estimate the ATE in that context.
Treatment effects may vary with observed characteristics of the treated units,
the program, or the broader environment. Djebbari and Smith (2008) call this
“systematic” variation in treatment effects. For example, individuals who com-
plete high school might benefit more from classroom-based occupational skills
training courses than those who drop out, or an organizational intervention might
work better in teaching hospitals than in other hospitals, or an active labour mar-
ket program may have larger (or smaller) impacts during business cycle peaks than
during troughs. Such variation interests researchers and policymakers for several
reasons. Variation based on observed unit characteristics can guide efforts to use
statistical treatment rules to target program services as in Manski (2004) and
Lechner and Smith (2007). Variation in treatment effects allows researchers to
test theories of treatment effect heterogeneity, as in Pitt et al. (2010). Finally,
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and perhaps most importantly, treatment effect heterogeneity provides an input
into discussions about the generalizability of findings across time, places and
participant populations, what the literature calls their “external validity”; see,
e.g., Hotz et al. (2005) and Muller (2015).
3. Partial equilibrium evaluation methods
This section lays out the standard econometric methods used to estimate the
impact of interventions in a partial equilibrium context, i.e., in the context of
the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) introduced earlier. As
standard statistical software packages now make it easy to use a variety of so-
phisticated estimators for partial equilibrium causal effects, the key intellectual
exercises in most studies consist of: (1) justifying the SUTVA in the context at
hand, (2) defending the chosen estimator’s identification assumptions by making
a case based on some combination of theory, contextual knowledge, specification
tests and pre-existing empirical evidence and (3) correctly interpreting the results
in light of the economics and context given the chosen identification strategy and
estimator.
3.1. Social experiments
3.1.1. Random assignment and the selection bias problem
As noted above, experiments solve the selection bias problem by randomly forcing
units that want to receive treatment to experience the untreated outcome instead,
thereby ensuring that (in large samples) the treated and the control groups6 have
the same observed and unobserved characteristics.7 In a randomized control
trial, Zi is the indicator for assignment to the treatment group; with perfect
compliance, Ti =Zi while with partial compliance, Zi imperfectly predicts Ti . In
either case, Zi is, by construction, uncorrelated with all observed and unobserved
unit characteristics. This implies that E(Y0|Z =1)=E(Y0|Z =0), which in turn
implies that the difference in mean outcomes between the treatment and control
groups estimates the ATET without bias when Zi =Ti .
Probably Canada’s best known large scale social experiments are the Self-
Sufficiency Project (e.g., Ford et al. 2003, Lise et al. 2004, Card and Hyslop 2009
and Riddell and Riddell 2014), which randomly assigned single parents on in-
come assistance in two provinces to a generous earnings subsidy program, and the
6 The economics literature uses the term “control group” rather loosely. We prefer a more precise
categorization that restricts the term “control” to experimental or closely related situations
where (active) control over the assignment of treatment status actually exists. In other situations
we prefer the term “comparison group.” It seems counterintuitive to apply the term control
group to a situation where there is patently no control.
7 In some fields of economics, such as international trade, social experiments have not
traditionally been undertaken and/or are not feasible, but this does not prevent experiments
from serving as an intellectual touchstone. Also, while we focus in this section on random
assignment addressing internal validity, it is random selection into the experimental group from
the relevant population that addresses external validity.
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“Mincome” guaranteed minimum income experiment in Manitoba considered in
Hum and Simpson (1993) and Forget (2011). Less-expensive (though sometimes
quite large scale) experiments have also occurred in the context of government
operations (e.g., Warburton and Warburton 2002), and a large number of ex-
periments can be found in health economics (e.g., Levin et al. 2007). There is
tremendous potential to improve our understanding of the functioning of social,
educational and other programs by introducing randomization or other sources
of exogenous variation into program operations.
In the US, experiments have been applied to policy areas as diverse as health
insurance, welfare-to-work programs, the handling of calls to the police reporting
domestic violence, electricity pricing and abstinence-only sex education. Green-
berg and Schroder (2004) document almost all of the earlier US experiments while
Greenberg et al. (1999) present evidence on their characteristics. There has also
been an explosion in experiments in developing countries; see Banerjee and Duflo
(2009) on that score and see Levitt and List (2009) on the rise of experiments in
economics more generally.
3.1.2. Issues with random assignment
Barnow (2010) says that random assignment is not a substitute for thinking. We
agree that experiments present a more difficult evaluation challenge than their
basic conceptual simplicity suggests. If well executed, experiments accomplish
one very important thing: they eliminate the bias that results from non-random
selection into treatment in partial equilibrium evaluations in a simple and com-
pelling way. As noted by Heckman and Smith (2000), however, experiments re-
main subject to many of the other threats to internal validity that make empirical
program evaluation using observational data so fraught with difficulties (and so
interesting) such as outliers, survey non-response and attrition, error-filled and
poorly documented administrative data, Hawthorne effects (when research sub-
jects react to being observed) and John Henry effects (when experimental subjects
react to being in the control group). In addition to these general issues, experi-
ments also raise or exacerbate particular issues of internal and external validity.
Though not often discussed in economics, the simple fact of randomization
does not in and of itself suffice for the identification of the ATET in an experiment
with perfect compliance. A causal interpretation of the experimental estimand
requires the additional assumption that randomized treatment assignment affects
outcomes only via its effect on receipt of treatment. If we think of randomiza-
tion as an ideal instrument in the sense of Heckman (1996a), this corresponds to
the “exclusion restriction” assumption, which requires that an instrument affect
outcomes only via its effect on the endogenous variable of interest. If, for exam-
ple, explicit assignment to an experimental control group induces John Henry
effects—reactive responses by control group members—then this assumption
fails.
Outside economics, high quality pharmaceutical randomized control trials ad-
dress this concern by being “blind” (the unit being randomized does not know and
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thus cannot react to treatment status) or even better “double-blind” (neither the
unit being randomized nor the program administrators know the treatment sta-
tus). Failure of the exclusion restriction condition requires subtle interpretation;
the medical literature reinterprets the control group as representing a placebo
treatment rather than no treatment. Rather obviously, blinding presents insur-
mountable difficulties for most social experiments. For example, what would a
placebo training program look like? Instead, researchers need to defend the plau-
sibility of the exclusion restriction in their context and readers need to judge the
credibility of these arguments.
In practice, experimental evaluations often fail to achieve full compliance. Not
all treatment group members receive treatment or some control group members
receive treatment (“cross-overs”) or substitute something similar. In contexts with
treatment group dropout and control group substitution the experiment ends up
randomly assigning access to treatment, rather than treatment itself. Heckman
et al. (2000) document the empirical importance of dropout and substitution in
the context of US evaluations of employment and training programs. Researchers
typically react to dropout and/or substitution in one of two ways. The first consists
of reinterpreting the estimand as the mean impact of the offer of treatment (called
“intention to treat” or ITT) rather than the mean impact of treatment itself. For
policy purposes, this may have a greater interest than the ATET as researchers and
governments can typically make offers of treatment but not compel it. The second
consists of using random assignment as an instrument for receipt of treatment and
interpreting the resulting estimand as a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE),
which corresponds to the average effect of treatment on those induced to change
treatment status via randomization to the treatment group.8
Experimental evaluations may also have issues with external validity above
and beyond those present in non-experimental evaluations. Random selection of
eligible units for an experiment with a sufficiently large number of units ensures
external validity. But in evaluations that require voluntary participation by local
program sites, random assignment may raise the perceived cost of site partici-
pation and so lead to a non-random selection of sites, as described in Doolittle
and Traeger (1990) for the US Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) experiment.
Similarly, the additional consent apparatus required for individual randomiza-
tion may non-randomly deter participation, as in the UK Employment Retention
and Advancement experiment studied in Sianesi (2014). On a different margin,
experimental evaluations may require a program to dig deeper into its eligible
population than it usually would in order to fill up the control group while still
maintaining its normal scale of operations. Finally, randomized rather than de-
terministic access to treatment may deter complementary investments prior to
8 We say more about LATEs in our discussion of instrumental variables below. See Heckman,
Smith et al. (1998) for more on dropout and section 5 of Heckman et al. (1999) for a more
thorough general discussion. Kline and Walters (2015) provide an empirical example and
pointers to the recent literature.
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treatment or change the composition of participants by deterring the risk averse
and attracting the risk loving.
A broader discussion embodied in the tryptic of Deaton (2010), Heckman
(2010) and Imbens (2010) raises issues related to the nature and extent of the
role of experimental methods within economics. In particular, it considers the
importance of using methods that ensure compelling identification and so allow
strong claims to internal validity. An exclusive focus on randomization (or on
strong partial equilibrium designs more generally) may lead the discipline away
from theoretical interpretability and external validity and may also lead to a fo-
cus on policy questions that experiments can easily address rather than a focus
on the most substantively important policy questions.9 As noted in the introduc-
tion, we think that experiments and structure often represent complements in the
production of economic knowledge rather than substitutes. This comes through
most strongly in the increasingly common analyses that explicitly combine the
two, such as Lise et al. (2004) or Todd and Wolpin (2006). More broadly, as
discussed in detail in Rothstein and von Wachter (2015), economic theory often
provides an important guide to the questions worth studying using experiments
and other strong designs, to the design of such studies, to the choice of outcome
variables, to the choice of variables to measure and examine as potential medi-
ators, to the conduct of cost–benefit analyses and so on. In sum, we think this
debate ultimately makes the case for more thoughtful use of experimentation in
the profession, not for its abandonment.
3.1.3. Variants of random assignment
Random assignment has many uses beyond the estimation of the ATET for use
in cost–benefit analyses of whether to keep or drop programs. Additional uses
address questions that sometimes possess equal or greater policy relevance and
often avoid or reduce political, practical and ethical concerns related to a control
group that receives little (if any) treatment. Consider some illustrative real world
examples.
Black et al. (2003) document the clever use of randomization in the unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) system in Kentucky. Like other US states, Kentucky employs
a statistical model to predict the fraction of their (traditionally) 26 weeks of UI
benefit entitlement each new claimant will consume as a function of claimant
and local area characteristics. Kentucky converts this continuous prediction into
a discrete score from 1 to 20. In each local UI office in each week, the state assigns
mandatory reemployment services to new UI claimants starting with those with
the highest score and proceeding until it runs out of slots or claimants. In many
9 Or analysts may focus on strong design-based estimates even when they correspond to
parameters of limited policy interest, as with the enthusiasm in the minimum wage literature for
compelling estimates of the short-run labor demand response when the long-run demand
response should guide most policy. As Sorkin (2015) shows, these two responses can differ quite
substantially.
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cases, for the marginal score (the one where the slots run out) the number of
claimants with that score exceeds the number of remaining slots; the claimants
with that score are randomly assigned to the remaining slots.
The “randomization at the margin” approach used in Kentucky has many
positive aspects, including low cost, no direct caseworker involvement and staff
perceptions of fairness. Moreover, it provides compelling experimental evidence
that addresses the question of the effects of the mandatory reemployment services
requirement on claimants at the margin of having it imposed. As the primary
policy question in this area concerns small increases or decreases in the budget
rather than program termination, this evidence corresponds to the cost–benefit
analysis of greatest policy interest.
Perez-Johnson et al. (2011) experimentally evaluate three alternative ways of
structuring the “Individual Training Accounts” (ITAs) provided to some partic-
ipants in the US Workforce Investment Act (WIA) program. Everyone receives
services but important aspects of the service delivery process differ among the
treatment arms. The policy question addressed in this evaluation concerns not
keeping or scrapping the WIA program, nor expanding or contracting it, but
rather how to operate the ITA component of the program most effectively.
In some cases, elements of service provision are de facto randomized by virtue
of the structure of particular programs and researchers can take advantage of
these sources of exogenous variation to better understand the associated causal
impacts. For example, Oreopoulos (2003) exploits the institutional framework
that allocates subsidized housing in Toronto. When they reach the top of the list,
families in the queue for subsidized housing are matched to the first appropriately
sized accommodation that comes available. These accommodations could be in
extremely large, or quite small, housing projects in neighbourhoods of quite
different socio-economic status. He uses this “as good as” random assignment to
estimate neighbourhood effects on long-term outcomes.
More proactively, the British Columbia government was uncertain about the
value of, and need for, annual reviews of its income assistance case files (which
both clients and managers consider a burden)—reviews that had been regularly
undertaken for years. Warburton and Warburton (2002) discuss how half the
caseload was randomly assigned to “no review” as opposed to the standard “an-
nual review.” This provided credible evidence for decision-making and is a rare
example of an experiment whose operation reduced expenditures, while the cost
of analysis was trivial. Other variants of random assignment include randomized
rollout of programs too big to put in place in all locations at the same time and
randomized encouragement designs, as in Hirano et al. (2000), that randomly as-
sign not treatment but an incentive to participate in the treatment for voluntary
programs.
In short, given the tremendous variety of possible randomized designs, we
can hardly over-emphasize the potential to use persuasive yet inexpensive (and
relatively uncontroversial) experimental evaluations to generate knowledge about
program operations and impact.
Causal effects of policies 883
3.1.4. Ethics, politics and experiments
Policymakers and other stakeholders sometimes express ethical concerns with
the random service denial inherent in random assignment designs with “no treat-
ment” or even “less treatment” control groups. Advocates of experiments can
address such concerns directly. First, evaluation efforts should focus on pro-
grams whose impacts and cost–benefit performance remain uncertain. In such
cases, there is no way to tell in advance whether the control group is being ran-
domly punished through denial of valuable services or randomly saved from an
ineffective treatment. Second, experimental participants can always be compen-
sated for contributing to the public good of knowledge creation. Unlike the case
of medical treatments where larger payments are sometimes made, modest pay-
ments should quell any ethical concerns in the social policy domain. Third, an
alternative and perhaps weightier ethical concern militates in favour of random
assignment. Given limited resources, the operation of programs that do not ben-
eficially impact clients implies the withholding of funds from programs that do
have beneficial impacts. How can society ethically allocate taxpayer funds across
alternatives without a compelling evidentiary basis when they can easily bring
about the production of such evidence?
3.2. Non-experimental evaluation: Selection on observed variables
Now consider the very different case where non-random selection into treat-
ment occurs but the analyst observes all the variables with important effects on
both participation and the outcome of interest in the absence of participation.
Economists call this case “selection on observed variables” while statisticians
call it “unconfoundedness.” In this case, the analyst does not observe Zi ; instead
it lurks in the shadows producing exogenous variation in treatment status con-
ditional on the observed variables Xi . It implies that, conditional on observed
variables, Ti is “as good as” randomly assigned. Formally, this strategy builds
on the Conditional (mean) Independence Assumption (CIA), E(Y0|X , T =1)=
E(Y0|X , T =0).10
The CIA represents a very strong assumption indeed! In our view, most evalu-
ations that rely on this assumption fall far short of making a compelling case for
it, sometimes because of data limitations and sometimes, more broadly, because
we simply lack the knowledge in many policy contexts regarding the variables on
which we should condition. Successful application of this strategy requires careful
thought about the institutions and economics of the situation in order to make
the case that all of the variables that theory and existing empirical knowledge
suggest should appear among the conditioning variables in fact do so. Commen-
tators including Heckman et al. (1999, section 6.6) and Rubin (2008) stress this
issue. Making this case requires much more than just saying, as many evaluations
do, that the evaluation uses “rich” data containing a large number of variables.
10 In the standard notation of the parametric linear model, the CIA becomes E(u|T , X )=E(u|X ),
where u is the “error” term. The CIA is weaker than the usual exogeneity assumption
E(u|T , X )=0. Under the CIA, the conditioning variables justify a causal interpretation of the
effect of T but lack any causal interpretation of their own.
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It is not the number of conditioning variables that matters, but rather having the
ones that make the CIA plausible.
Conversely, conditioning on variables that do not satisfy the CIA, such as
intermediate outcomes (a.k.a. “mediators”) is equally troubling. For example,
conditioning on current occupation when estimating the impact of a labour mar-
ket program on earnings yields biased estimates because the program may affect
earnings via occupational choice. Sometimes researchers even fail to heed the
warnings of Bhattacharya and Vogt (2012) and condition on instruments (i.e.,
variables that affect outcomes only via their effect on treatment choice—more on
these shortly).
Policymakers and evaluators can take steps to make the evidence provided
by evaluations based on the CIA more compelling. The design of the program
can include explicit guidance regarding the factors that gatekeepers should use in
making access decisions, which serves to clarify important conditioning variables.
Collecting data on factors that are measureable but often go unmeasured, such
as attitudes toward work, future orientation (i.e., the subjective discount rate),
risk aversion, motivation, social and other non-cognitive skills and the cognitive
ability of potential program participants, will also make the selection on observed
variables assumption more credible in particular contexts.
An interesting example of the thoughtful choice of conditioning variables
comes from a study looking at Ontario physicians’ reactions to the offer from
the provincial government to shift from fee-for-service to a capitation (fee-per-
patient) payment model by Kantarevic and Kralj (2013). In a propensity score
matching framework, one of the variables they match on measures the difference
in annual earnings if each physician’s pre-policy-change pattern of medical prac-
tice is priced using both the old and new payment models. That is, it identifies the
practice’s revenue gain (or loss) from switching to the new payment model holding
constant the pre-choice list of billable tasks. Without conditioning on this type
of variable (jointly with demographics), selection on observed variables would
lack credibility, casting in doubt any causal interpretation. Of course, while in-
cluding a measure of the revenue change associated with treatment will convince
many readers, others might worry that this study lacks explicit conditioning vari-
ables capturing the administrative or physic costs (or gains) of switching payment
models. The authors make no argument on this front.
In some contexts the literature clearly documents the value of flexibly condi-
tioning on past outcomes measured at a relatively fine level of temporal detail.
These pre-participation-choice outcomes implicitly capture many otherwise un-
observed variables affecting both treatment choice and outcomes such as mo-
tivation, ability and appearance. In the specific context of active labour market
programs, see, for example, Heckman, Ichimura, et al. (1998) and Dolton and
Smith (2011) on this point.
More broadly, researchers can pursue an agenda that seeks to cumulate
knowledge regarding the variables that matter for eliminating selection bias in
particular substantive contexts. That agenda can include both within-study
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comparisons using experiments as benchmarks—i.e., the literature starting with
LaLonde (1986)—as well as the collection and use of new sorts of variables in
evaluations to see if they affect the estimates, as with the firm characteristics in
Andersson et al. (2013) and the psychological variables in Caliendo et al. (2014).
Pursuing such an agenda represents a proactive alternative to the more common
strategy of endless carping about potential omitted variables in evaluations that
rely on the CIA.
Finally, in cases where the selection on observed variables assumption lacks
credibility but where existing knowledge allows for a somewhat informative prior
about the nature and extent of the remaining selection bias, formal sensitivity
analyses along the lines of those in Altonji et al. (2005) and Koremenos and
Smith (2015) for parametric linear models and Ichino et al. (2008) for matching
estimators can indicate the substantive and inferential consequences of reason-
able departures from the CIA. We think the literature would benefit from more
analyses along these lines.
When relying on the CIA, analysts typically estimate a parametric linear re-
gression model by least squares, or a non-linear parametric model such as a probit
by maximum likelihood, or employ matching or weighting estimators based on
the estimated propensity score, Pr(T = 1|X ). In general, weighting and match-
ing estimators represent the first choice for various technical reasons, provided
the sample size justifies their use.11 Angrist (1998) points out that, in a world of
heterogeneous treatment effects, the OLS estimand in the parametric linear re-
gression model does not correspond to the ATET, while the estimand associated
with commonly used matching and weighting estimators does correspond to the
ATET. The difference arises from the fact that OLS and matching weight the data
differently.12
Aside from relaxing functional form assumptions, a major advantage of match-
ing estimators is that they push researchers to think carefully about common
support issues. In the region of common support, the probability of partic-
ipation is bounded away from zero and one, i.e., 0 < Pr(T = 1|X ) < 1. Most
matching estimators, properly applied, produce estimates only on the region
of common support. As noted in Black and Smith (2004) and Crump et al.
(2009), limiting estimation to the common support changes the sub-population
to which the treatment effect applies. At the same time, it may substantially in-
crease the credibility of the reported estimates. In contrast, the parametric linear
model happily ignores support issues by implicitly projecting impacts into regions
with only treated or only untreated units (or neither). While researchers could
examine support issues when estimating parametric linear models, they rarely
11 See Huber et al. (2013), Busso et al. (2014) and Frölich et al. (2015) for technical details and
Monte Carlo comparisons of alternative estimators.
12 Another class of estimators combines matching or weighting with parametric linear regression.
This class includes the widely used (outside of economics) “double robust” estimator that
combines inverse propensity weighting with parametric linear regression. See, for example, Ho
et al. (2007), the studies cited in the preceding footnote and the discussion in Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009, section 5.8).
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do so in practice. As such, we think matching adds value, even if only as a
supplementary feature of an analysis, by letting researchers know whether or
not they have a support problem. They can then, if they choose to, make an
explicit case for extrapolating impacts beyond the region of common
support.13
3.3. Instrumental variables
Instrumental variables (IV) sometimes provide consistent estimates of causal pa-
rameters in contexts where the CIA does not hold given the available data.14
Not surprisingly, the application of instrumental variables requires a credible
instrument (a version of Z from section 2), which need not exist in many con-
texts. A bit loosely, an instrument is a variable that: (i) affects participation in
the treatment sufficiently strongly but (ii) is conditionally uncorrelated with out-
comes other than through its effect on participation. The literature calls (i) the
“first stage” condition (in reference to the common application of two-stage least
squares when using instrumental variables) and (ii) the “exogeneity” or “exclusion
restriction” condition. These two properties sometimes conflict in practice as
many naturally occurring candidate instruments either strongly predict treat-
ment but lack credible exogeneity or appear credibly exogenous but only weakly
predict treatment.
Where do good instruments come from? Sometimes nature provides instru-
ments, which can be as diverse as fluctuations in rainfall or temperature or the
sex composition of children. Social events, governments and other institutions
sometimes provide exogenous variation in forms such as strikes, changes in com-
pulsory schooling laws, or even random fluctuations in emergency room admis-
sions. Often, this variation represents plausibly exogenous variation in the cost
of treatment, Ci . In each situation, researchers need to make a good case that
their instrument has the properties of a valid instrument described above, or else
abandon the effort. Contrary to what one might casually infer from reading the
applied literature, we know of no systematic evidence that instrument validity
increases in instrument cleverness.
In thinking about how to evaluate candidate instruments, we begin with the
first stage condition (i). Following the literature, we focus on binary instruments,
i.e. Z ∈{0, 1}, with some remarks at the end about the more general case. In the bi-
nary IV case, the first stage condition becomes Pr(T =1|Z =0) =Pr(T =1|Z =1).
IV is consistent, but biased in finite samples. The extent of the finite sample bias
(which is toward the corresponding OLS estimate) depends on the strength of the
first stage relationship. Bound et al. (1995) show that substantial bias can emerge
even in very large samples in the absence of a sufficiently strong first stage rela-
tionship. All applications of instrumental variables should consider the strength
13 See, for example, Heckman, Ichimura, et al. (1998), Angrist (1998), Smith and Todd (2005) and
Imbens (2015) for further methodological discussions.
14 Both difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity represent special cases of
instrumental variables; we follow the literature in discussing them separately.
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of the first stage in light of the various results in the “weak instruments” litera-
ture, which includes the famous rule of thumb that the first stage F-statistic on
the instruments (not the entire first stage) should exceed 10 offered up in Stock
et al. (2002).15
The second requirement, condition (ii), embodies two conceptually distinct
parts. First, a valid instrument may not have a direct effect on the outcome variable
of interest. Second, a valid instrument may not have an indirect effect operating
through a channel other than the treatment under study. In a parametric linear
common effect world, i.e., a world in which the treatment has the same effect
on all units, these two conditions correspond to (assuming) a zero correlation
between the instrument Z and the outcome equation error (e.g., the error term
in the second stage of two stage least squares).
To put some substantive flesh on these conceptual bones, consider an example
with earnings as the outcome variable of interest, high school completion as the
binary treatment and the mandatory school leaving age as the binary instrument,
as in Oreopoulos (2006), where, for simplicity, we imagine that some jurisdictions
in some periods have a school leaving age of 16 (Z =0) and others a school leaving
age of 17 (Z =1). The first conceptual condition of requirement (ii) necessitates
that the direct effect of the school leaving age operates only through years of
schooling. If a higher school leaving age also induces students to, say, work
harder and learn more conditional on their years of completed schooling then
this condition fails. The second conceptual condition in (ii) requires that a higher
school leaving age does not correlate with other policies (for example, higher
quality vocational education) or other variables not included in the conditioning
set, such as parental education, that also increase earnings conditional on high
school completion and the included covariates.
Another way to think about what instruments do sees them as extracting a
particular subset of the variation in the endogenous variable. If we mentally di-
vide the variation in the endogenous variable into “good” (not correlated with the
outcome equation error term) and “bad” (correlated with the outcome equation
error term) variation then instruments isolate a subset of the “good” variation
and use only that variation in estimation. The cost of throwing out the “bad”
variation (and, typically, much of the “good” variation as well) comes in the
form of larger standard errors, reflecting the reduction in effective variation in
the treatment. While economists typically treat consistency and variance lexico-
graphically, with variance minimized conditional on finding a consistent estima-
tor, a mean squared error criterion would sometimes prefer inconsistent but more
precise OLS estimates to consistent but imprecise IV estimates, as noted in Black
et al. (2015).
15 In our experience, graduate students have an uncanny knack for uncovering instruments with
first-stage F-statistics between 9 and 10. See Murray (2006) for an accessible introduction to the
weak instrument literature. Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest alternatives to two-stage least
squares for instruments of marginal strength.
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Moving to a heterogeneous treatment effects world (i.e., a realistic world) opens
up the possibility of a second type of selection bias. The traditional instrumen-
tal variables approach (and, indeed, the earlier applied literature more broadly)
worried only about non-random selection into treatment based on unobserved
determinants of the outcome, as with the literature on ability bias in the estima-
tion of the effects of schooling. In contrast, the modern approach embodied in
the model in section 2 worries about selection both on the unobserved component
of the untreated outcome and on the idiosyncratic component of the impact. For
example, holding costs constant, we expect students choosing between finishing
high school and dropping out to select into finishing high school when they expect
worse labour market outcomes without finishing (i.e., a smaller opportunity cost)
and higher payoffs from high school completion (i.e., a larger treatment effect).
In the heterogeneous treatment effects world the outcome equation error term
includes both the unobserved component of the untreated outcome and, for the
treated units, the idiosyncratic component of the unit-specific impact. In order
to interpret the IV estimand as the ATET, the instrument must have a zero cor-
relation with both of these components. The literature on applied econometrics
has spent the last decade or so coming to grips with the fact that many common
classes of instruments likely fail this condition.
To see this, return to the case of an experiment with imperfect compliance
introduced in section 3.1. As noted by Heckman (1996a), random assignment
represents a special case of instrumental variables. Here Z = 1 denotes random
assignment to the treatment group and Z = 0 random assignment to the control
group. Now suppose that the randomized population consists of individuals who
know their impact of treatment and that for one third it equals 200, for one third
it equals 100 and for one third it equals zero. Suppose further that participating
in treatment costs 50 in the treatment group and, because of the necessity of
finding an alternative provider, 150 in the control group. In a simple maximizing
model treatment group members with impacts of 200 and 100 take the treatment,
while those with impacts of zero do not, as it fails a cost–benefit test for them.
Similarly, in the control group only, those with impacts of 200 take the treatment,
as it only passes a cost–benefit test for them. Thus Pr(T = 1|Z = 1) = 2=3 and
Pr(T = 1|Z = 0) = 1=3. The now-standard terminology of Imbens and Angrist
(1994) calls those with an impact of 200 “always takers,” because they take the
treatment for both values of the instrument (i.e., when assigned to either the
treatment group or the control group). Similarly, it calls those with a zero impact
“never takers.” The term “compliers” captures those who take treatment when
assigned to the treatment group but not when assigned to the control group,
which is to say that they comply with the intent of the experimenter.
With imperfect compliance, Z = T but so long as Pr(T = 1|Z = 1) = Pr(T =
1|Z = 0), Z will continue to satisfy the “first stage” condition. Thinking about
assignment to the control group as raising the cost of receiving treatment makes
it natural to assume, as in our example, that anyone who receives treatment when
assigned to the control group would also do so when assigned to the treatment
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group. This represents an application of what the Imbens and Angrist (1994) call
the “monotonicity” assumption. Monotonicity rules out individuals who defy
the intent of the experiment by reversing the behaviour of the compliers. In this
example, these “defiers,” as the literature calls them, would take treatment when
assigned to the control group but not when assigned to the treatment group.
Now think about the simple IV estimator in the context of our contaminated
experiment. It divides the experimental mean difference by the difference in treat-
ment probabilities. This yields a value of 100 because the impact on the always-
takers cancels out in the experimental mean difference. In general, as in this
example, in a heterogeneous treatment effects world, and assuming monotonic-
ity, IV estimates the mean impact on compliers, which the literature calls the
Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE).
Returning to our earlier example, we see that changes in the compulsory
schooling age induce variation in schooling levels only for a particular subset
of the population. For example, increasing the age from 15 to 16 years in the
Canadian institutional context will affect only those individuals contemplating
dropping out prior to high school completion. The resulting treatment effect of
additional schooling refers only to those individuals whose schooling changes as
a result of the policy change and not to individuals who would graduate and go
to university (or drop out at 14 or 15) regardless of the value of the compulsory
schooling age.
In general, the literature provides only a very limited array of strategies for
testing the exogeneity assumption that underlies a valid instrument. In a com-
mon effect world, classical Durbin–Wu–Hausman tests provide some guidance
via tests of the equality of estimates based on different instruments. This strategy
falls apart in the heterogeneous treatment effects world where each instrument
identifies its own distinct LATE. Some substantive contexts admit “placebo”
(or falsification) tests of over-identifying restrictions. In these tests, the instru-
ment gets applied to a separate but related context (e.g., a different time period
or different jurisdiction) where the LATE is known to equal zero. Finally, one
can compare the LATE estimate from a candidate instrument to an experiment
designed to estimate a LATE, as in Black et al. (2016), but such experiments
remain few in number.
Instead of testing, analysts must generally make the case for the instrument
using the relevant theory, along with information about the institutional con-
text and prior knowledge regarding the determinants of treatment and outcomes
(and referees, editors and readers must assess those arguments). In the case of
cost-based instruments, the simplest of theory motivates both the first stage and
monotonicity. Institutional knowledge often helps to rule out competing path-
ways from the instrument to the outcome. And, of course, covariates matter here
too. Adding particular conditioning variables may make the exogeneity assump-
tion more plausible for particular instruments, as with our example of parental
education levels in the context of the mandatory schooling age. This process of
argumentation renders many instrumental variable estimates quite controversial.
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That different instrumental variables identify LATEs corresponding to differ-
ent complier groups complicates interpretation both within and across studies.
Hertzman et al. (2014) explore child apprehension rates in the British Columbia
foster care system using two quite different instruments and find that the LATE
identified via a measure of caseworker-specific administrative discretion in a sys-
tem operating “normally” differs from the LATE arising from an external shock
to the foster care system that simultaneously increased apprehension rates across
all caseworkers (and thereby changed the system, altering its scale, so that at least
in the short run it was not operating normally).
In common with Doyle (2008), to justify the monotonicity condition, and
thereby the LATE interpretation when using caseworker discretion as an in-
strument, these authors assume that lenient and strict social workers rank the
risks children face in a similar manner but differ regarding the threshold for
apprehension. In contrast, if social workers disagree on the ranking, with low-
probability-of-apprehension social workers taking children into care that higher-
probability-of-apprehension social workers would consider safe with their family,
then the monotonicity assumption fails. In this case, the IV estimand represents
not a LATE but rather a “muddle” unless, as pointed out by Angrist et al. (1996),
the compliers and defiers happen to have the same average treatment effect.
Some instruments identify LATEs of great relevance to policy, while others
do not. Usually instruments will not identify the ATET parameter, which means
that IV estimates typically cannot directly answer the “keep it or cut it” question
that underlies many cost–benefit analyses. On the other hand, an instrument that
varies, say, the costs of program participation at the margin, may provide exactly
the parameter of interest if the policy change under consideration consists of
modest spending increases to reduce the costs of program access. See, for exam-
ple, Angrist and Fernández-Val (2014) for more on generalizing and comparing
LATEs.
The Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) framework of Heckman and Vytlacil
(2005) generalizes the standard LATE setup to encompass discrete and contin-
uous instruments and other averages of heterogeneous treatment effects while
maintaining the monotonicity assumption. The MTE is the treatment effect for
units at the margin of treatment given a particular value of a particular instru-
ment. The LATE, the ATET and the ATE all then constitute particular integrals
over the distribution of MTEs. In practice, the set of treatment probabilities gen-
erated by a given instrument limits the set of MTE values over which integrals
can be calculated. For an application see Doyle (2008) or Heckman et al. (2011),
who emphasize that “local” as defined by a particular instrument may not be
“marginal” for some particular policy question.16
16 Chapter 4 of Angrist and Pischke (2009) provides a good introduction to IVs. Lewbel et al.
(2012) survey the binary choice context. Heckman et al. (2001) offer a broad conceptual
framework for thinking about instruments. Heckman and Urzúa (2010) discuss the limitations
of instrumental variables methods.
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3.4. Longitudinal methods
Longitudinal methods use variation over time in treatment status to estimate
the impact of treatment. Credible application of longitudinal methods relies
on a clear understanding of the process by which some units come to receive
treatment at particular times while other units receive treatment at other times
or not at all. In our experience, most applied papers using longitudinal meth-
ods and employing causal language make no explicit case for why the reader
should believe the assumptions required for a causal interpretation. To see the
importance of understanding the treatment assignment process, consider, for ex-
ample, the large literature on earnings changes with job changes (e.g., Moris-
sette et al. 2007). Differencing across voluntary quits implies quite a different
(and non-causal) interpretation compared to differencing across job changes
resulting from (involuntary-to-the-worker) plant or firm closures. Even for the
latter group differences in pre-separation earnings trajectories and the opportu-
nity for workers to quit prior to a plant closing, represent potential sources of
bias.
The simplest longitudinal method compares the outcomes of treated units
before and after treatment with no comparison group. Researchers may apply
this “before–after estimator” (or “interrupted time series design” for those with
higher consulting rates) to individuals, as when comparing outcomes before and
after participation in a training program, or to jurisdictions, as when comparing
alcohol-related fatalities at the province level before and after a change in the
minimum legal drinking age. Such before–after comparisons implicitly assume
that in the absence of the treatment or policy change, expected outcomes in the
“after” period would have equalled expected outcomes in the “before” period.
Sometimes this assumption makes sense and other times it does not. It fails when
other factors affecting outcomes also change over time.
Concerns about the plausibility of simple before–after comparisons have led
many researchers to prefer the “difference-in-differences” (DiD) estimator, which
introduces a comparison group; see Card et al. (2011) for a practical guide and
contrast to randomization. This estimator compares the before–after change in
outcomes of the treated units to the before–after change in the outcomes of a
sample of untreated units. DiD is a special case of a more general class of panel
data estimators that rely on within-unit variation over time to estimate the impacts
of programs or policies, using untreated units to control for counterfactual trends
in outcomes for the treated units. Both DiD and more general panel data studies
rely on the “bias stability” or “common trend” assumption which holds that the
before–after change in outcomes for the treated units would, in the absence of the
program or policy, equal (at least in expectation) that for the untreated units.17
Put differently, any differences between E(Y0|T = 1) and E(Y0|T = 0), or their
17 A more general assumption that allows selection into treatment based on linear time trends in
the untreated outcome rather than just on time invariant differences in outcome levels underlies
the so-called random growth model. Identification requires at least two periods of pre-treatment
outcomes. See, for example, Moffitt (1991).
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conditional on covariate analogues, must remain constant over time. Some parts
of the literature refer to this situation (perhaps a bit misleadingly) as a “natural
experiment”; for further discussion, see Meyer (1995).
In certain contexts, the bias stability assumption will make sense when an
assumption of no change in expected outcomes in the absence of treatment
for the treated units would not. At the same time, DiD is not a panacea. Re-
searchers need to make a solid case for the assumption’s reasonableness in their
context and readers need to judge the plausibility of those arguments to de-
termine the credibility of the causal claims. For example, selection into treat-
ment based on transitory outcome shocks implies failure of the common trends
assumption. Thus, much of the intellectual action when using these methods
centers on how and when the treated units came to be treated (and why the com-
parison units were not treated). Analysts must also worry about anticipatory
changes in behaviour prior to a treatment actually starting but as a direct re-
sult of its impending arrival, as when customers rush to buy prior to a sales tax
increase.
Some examples will clarify these issues and also illustrate the many different
types of comparison groups employed within this estimation framework. Heck-
man and Smith (1999) examine DiD in the context of a job training program. The
comparison group consists of eligible non-participants in the same local labour
markets as the participants. Using an experimental benchmark, they find that
DiD performs poorly in their context, exhibiting both bias and strong sensitivity
to the choice of before and after periods. This poor performance results from
the fact that training program participants select (in part) into training based on
transitory labour market shocks—typically job loss.
The famous minimum wage paper of Card and Krueger (1994) illustrates DiD
applied at the jurisdictional level. Their paper, as well as the companion paper
by Neumark and Wascher (2000) that uses (arguably) better data and obtains
a somewhat different answer, compares the changes in employment in a set of
fast food restaurants in a local labour market that straddles the New Jersey and
Pennsylvania border before and after an increase in the minimum wage that
affects only New Jersey. The focus on a single labour market plays a key role in the
plausibility of the estimates, though it also raises the possibility of spillover effects.
Milligan and Stabile’s (2007) evaluation of changes to Canada’s National Child
Benefit using DiD across provinces provides another example using jurisdictional
policy variation.
Many longitudinal studies do little to convince the reader that the timing of
treatment does not depend on transitory changes in the outcomes of interest. In
some cases, justifying a source of variation as exogenous will be easier when it
emanates from a third party, such as jurisdiction-level policy changes affecting
individuals, than when it is tied up with individual choices. Both the data at hand
and institutional knowledge can reveal the importance of selection into treat-
ment based on transitory outcome shocks. DiNardo and Lee (2010) emphasize
the value of “falsification” (or “placebo” or “pre-program”) tests based on impact
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estimates in periods prior to treatment when the true value equals zero under bias
stability. When rolling out new programs, governments can deliberately stagger
the rollout in ways unrelated to untreated outcomes so as to allow a compelling
causal analysis using longitudinal methods.18
3.5. Regression discontinuity
Regression discontinuity (RD) designs exploit discontinuous changes in treat-
ment receipt that typically result from discontinuities in program rules. The RD
design has the great virtue of conceptual simplicity. In situations where assign-
ment to treatment depends on a continuous variable, such as a test score or
proposal rating, and where the probability of treatment changes abruptly at a
particular cut-off value of that continuous variable, a comparison of mean out-
comes just above and just below the cut-off can provide a compelling source of
information about treatment effects. The literature calls the continuous variable
that determines treatment assignment the “running variable.” The econometric
literature defines a number of different estimators for the RD case, but they all
represent different ways of taking (weighted) averages of outcomes on the two
sides of the discontinuity.
In thinking about exactly what treatment effect gets estimated in the context
of a particular discontinuity, it helps to distinguish between “sharp” and “fuzzy”
RD designs (i.e., between Z perfectly or probabilistically determining T as in
section 3.3.1). In a sharp design, the probability of treatment moves from zero to
one at the cut-off value. In this case, RD identifies the average treatment effect for
units whose characteristics put them at the discontinuity. In a fuzzy design, the
probability of treatment need not equal zero or one on either side of the cut-off
but it must change discontinuously at the cut-off. For example, publicly funded
flu shots for those over age 65 could induce a discontinuity in the probability of
receiving a flu shot at that age. In the fuzzy case, under certain pesky but often
plausible additional assumptions, the RD design identifies the LATE on those
units that change their treatment status at the cut-off. For example, in the case of
the flu shots, a comparison of health outcomes on either side of the cut-off at age
65 would yield the mean impact of receiving a flu shot on individuals aged exactly
65 who would not get a shot unless it were free, the “compliers” in the language
of IV. It does not provide information on the impact of a shot on those near the
cut-off who would, or would not, get one irrespective of price or on individuals
much younger or older than 65.19
In both the sharp and fuzzy cases, generalizing the estimated impacts to units
with values of the running variable other than the value at the cut-off requires
18 Longitudinal estimators raise particular applied econometric issues. Bertrand et al. (2004)
highlight issues related to serial correlation of the error terms. Cameron and Miller (2015) and
MacKinnon and Webb (2016) address issues related to small numbers of cross-sectional units.
For more on longitudinal methods in a treatment effects context see Lechner (2010). Heckman
(1996b) critiques the application of DiD methods.
19 As in section 3.3, monotonicity rules out individuals who become less likely to get a flu shot
when the price falls.
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additional assumptions. The plausibility of such assumptions depends on prior
knowledge and the institutional context; see, for example, Wing and Cook (2013)
for an extended discussion.
Lemieux and Milligan (2008) utilize a sharp regression discontinuity design
to examine a policy change in Quebec that eliminated lower social assistance
benefits for childless recipients under age 30 compared to those over age 30. In
the presence of a large policy change (a 175% change in benefits at the cut-off)
they find strong evidence that the increased generosity of social assistance benefits
modestly reduced employment.
RD, like other identification strategies, has its issues. Using either calendar
time or age to define a discontinuity raises the potential for bias due to anticipa-
tory behaviour. RD requires sufficient data near the discontinuity to estimate a
treatment effect with reasonable power—a sometimes difficult standard to reach,
as documented in Schochet (2008). The discontinuity must build on a running
variable that both the program and the evaluators can measure without much
error and that potential participants or program staff cannot easily manipulate
in order to change their treatment status. For example, a generous subsidy to
firms with 10 or fewer employees will induce some firms to change their number
of employees from 11, 12 or 13 down to 10 in order to qualify for the subsidy. Such
behaviour invalidates the regression discontinuity design, as the firms on one side
of the margin (with 10 employees) no longer look like the firms on the other side
of the margin (with 11 employees) due to the self-selection. More broadly, the
substantive case for a causal interpretation of an RD estimand typically relies
on detailed institutional knowledge of the assignment process along with formal
testing, as in the McCrary (2008) density test for potential manipulation and
commonly used tests of covariate balance at the discontinuity.20
Finally, the opportunity to estimate impacts using RD methods depends
almost entirely on program design decisions made by policymakers and program
managers. Many of the existing evaluations using RD methods rely on the “luck”
of having available institutions that happen to embody useful discontinuities.
Policymakers and program operators should think prospectively about how to
design programs to embody discontinuities that will yield useful impact estimates.
4. Reductionist enthusiasms: Hierarchies and magic bullets
Both inside economics, as in Leigh (2009), and outside economics, as in Guyatt
et al. (2008), in the health/epidemiology literature, one sometimes sees propos-
als related to hierarchies of evidence that rank alternative causal identification
strategies. Typically, random assignment (the “gold standard”) tops the list, fol-
lowed by discontinuity designs, instrumental variables and bias stability (e.g.,
20 Cook (2008) gives a broad history of regression discontinuity in the social sciences. For
methodological details see the fine surveys by van der Klaauw (2008), Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010).
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difference-in-differences) designs, then studies relying on selection on observed
variables and, finally, before–after comparisons (with, occasionally, case studies,
theory or expert opinion (!) rounding out the field).
We do not dispute that if one did a serious, impartial, quality ranking accord-
ing to well-defined and generally agreed-upon criteria that the average quality
of well-executed evaluation studies using each method would likely correspond
to such an ordering. At the same time, we worry that hierarchies, in their rush
to reduce the amount of troublesome thinking required in evaluating evidence,
focus solely on the between-strategy variation in study quality while ignoring the
(quite substantial) within-strategy variation. As such, at the margin, they encour-
age weak papers using, say, random assignment and RD and discourage strong
papers using, say, selection on observed variables methods. Sometimes, given a
particular dataset and context, nominally moving “up” the hierarchy may make
things worse rather than better, as when a weak and/or not obviously valid in-
strument replaces a reasonably compelling set of conditioning variables, thereby
inflating the standard errors and quite possibly increasing the bias as well. In
sum, we think of hierarchies of evidence as useful for governments and others
in considering the design of a research program, but applied simplistically, they
represent a flawed and ultimately counter-productive substitute for thinking that
attempts to institutionalize the credibility revolution into a ritualistic identifica-
tion strategy choice algorithm.
A second enthusiasm leads directly to the (in this sense) misguided literature set
in motion by LaLonde (1986). It seeks the holy grail of non-experimental evalua-
tion: a method that always and everywhere solves the selection problem. Dehejia
and Wahba (1999, 2002) represent famous papers in this approach, which many
(not including their authors) have interpreted as showing that matching “works”
in the sense of always solving the selection problem. These papers spawned a large
literature addressing the question “does matching work?” by comparing match-
ing estimates to experimental estimates, sometimes using remarkably weak sets
of conditioning variables in the matching. In fact, the question “does matching
work?” is ill posed. Matching “works” in the sense of providing consistent esti-
mates when the available variables suffice for the CIA to hold, and not otherwise.
Thus, we know the answer to the generic “does matching work?” question in
advance; it is “sometimes, but only when the data and context support it.”
Rather than searching for a non-existent magic bullet estimator, we argue that
the literature should seek to build a body of knowledge on what combinations
of identification strategy and data work for particular combinations of institu-
tions and questions of interest. Rather than relying on a hierarchy or on this
year’s magic bullet to choose an identification strategy for a particular project,
researchers should seek to use the strategy best suited to providing a compelling
impact estimate. And, of course, credibility includes an acknowledgement of the
limits on what can be claimed with confidence. Sometimes no design-based econo-
metric path to credible causal evidence exists given the institutional context and
available data.
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5. Spillovers and other general equilibrium effects
General equilibrium effects of programs and policies include both their effects on
persons, organizations or markets that do not directly participate and spillover
effects among participants. Such effects have proven, in general, quite difficult
to pin down, but we argue that, contrary to the belief implicit in much of the
literature, “difficult to estimate” does not imply “equals zero.”
Evaluations can often pick up direct spillovers via thoughtful data collection.
For example, an educational intervention increasing the amount of classroom
time devoted to mathematics in primary school should collect outcome data
not only on math achievement but also on achievement in the subjects whose
classroom time gets reduced. Evaluations of labour market programs should
collect data on social outcomes such as volunteering, criminal behaviour and child
outcomes and behaviour, as in the Morris and Michalopoulos (2003) analysis of
Canada’s Self-Sufficiency Project.
Evaluators sometimes obtain estimates of spillovers by assigning treatment
at the group (or location) level and measuring outcomes for both participants
and non-participants. For example, the clever village-level random assignment in
the evaluation of the PROGRESA conditional cash transfer program in Mexico,
combined with the collection of data on both eligible and ineligible households in
both treatment and control villages allows Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) to pro-
vide a subtle analysis of within-village spillovers from the program. Crépon et al.
(2013) represents an apogee of this approach. In their study of a French active
labour market program, they randomly assign both eligible individuals within
jurisdictions and the fraction of the eligible population treated at the jurisdic-
tional level. Using the cross-jurisdiction variation in the experimental impacts
as a function of the fraction of the eligible treated they pin down substantively
important effects on non-participants.
In many cases, obtaining estimates of general equilibrium effects will require
writing down and either estimating or calibrating a structural model of the rel-
evant market. This approach represents a major investment of evaluator time
and energy and requires a different skill set, more like that of modern macro-
economics, than that possessed by many in the partial equilibrium causal im-
pact (i.e., program evaluation) business. Most evaluations should, however, draw
on this broader literature when discussing the nature and extent of equilibrium
effects in particular contexts and their potential to affect the conclusion of a
cost–benefit analysis.
Three examples highlight the power of this sort of analysis, along with its
effort costs and heavy reliance on economic theory in general and specific func-
tional form assumptions in particular. Davidson and Woodbury (1993) look
for displacement effects in one of the US Unemployment Insurance (UI) bonus
experiments, which paid claimants a lump sum if they ended their claim within a
specific number of weeks. They estimate that the displacement of workers not in
the experiment cancelled out about 20% of the employment impact of the program
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estimated in the experiment. In a study of tuition subsidy programs for university
students, Heckman, Lochner et al. (1998) find much larger general equilibrium
effects. In their study, the partial equilibrium estimate of the impact of treatment
on the treated is 10 times larger than a general equilibrium impact that accounts
for the decline in the relative wage of persons with a university degree resulting
from an increased supply. Finally, Lise et al. (2004) examine the general equilib-
rium effects of Canada’s Self-Sufficiency Project. They find that taking account
of the program’s effects on the job search behaviour of other workers (and of
the single parents themselves early in their spells of income assistance receipt)
leads to a reversal of the positive cost–benefit conclusions reached in the partial
equilibrium experimental evaluation.
6. Cost–benefit analyses
Cost–benefit analysis exposes the full range of costs and benefits associated with a
policy or program by requiring their itemization, justification and valuation. For
reasons of time and space, we do not attempt a full consideration of cost–benefit
analysis. Instead, we highlight a small number of important issues often ignored
in practice.
First, we emphasize the importance of doing a full-blown cost–benefit anal-
ysis, especially for large and/or expensive programs and particularly influential
ones such as Perry Preschool (e.g., Heckman et al. 2010). Second, we highlight
the importance of considering multiple outcomes. For example, employment and
training programs may have impacts on outcomes other than earnings and em-
ployment, such as participation in transfer programs, health, marital and family
behaviour, volunteering and crime. Some outcomes present real challenges to
the analyst who must convert them to dollar terms, as with primary school test
scores. But, as noted in relation to general equilibrium effects, “hard to measure”
does not imply “equals zero.” Third, evaluations of labour market programs (in
particular) need to account for the lost value of participant “leisure” (which
may include childcare and the care of sick and aging relatives), as emphasized in
Greenberg and Robins (2008).
Fourth, a complete analysis should account for the marginal social cost of
public funds (a.k.a. the “excess burden”) and so recognize that a dollar of public
funds costs society more than a dollar due to distortionary taxation (Dahlby
2008). Fifth, evaluations typically have available only a few years of follow-up
data. For programs expected to have impacts in the long term, this implies pro-
jecting the impact estimates to time periods outside the data. In some cases, the
cost–benefit performance of a program may depend critically on these projec-
tions. We suggest presenting the results of the cost–benefit analysis conditional
on multiple assumptions about the persistence of any estimated program impacts,
as in Andersson et al. (2013). The assumptions about impact persistence should
build on findings on the persistence of impacts in similar programs drawn from
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the literature. Sixth, most programs incur costs in the short term but reap their
benefits, if any, in both the present and the future. Taking proper account of the
timing of benefits requires the discounting of future benefits (and costs, if any)
back to the present. Doing this, in turn, requires a well-justified social discount
rate, as discussed by Burgess (2010).
Seventh, we often experience a sense of wonder when we learn, in response to
questions about the cost of particular public programs, that no good information
exists. Serious cost–benefit analysis requires good data on marginal and average
costs, data that public agencies ought to have handy in any event to guide their
decision-making. Finally, a complete cost–benefit analysis should take account of
general equilibrium effects when possible. This may require a separate evaluation
component or it may rely on estimates from the literature for similar programs.21
7. Concluding remarks
As a discipline, economics’ relevance depends in large part upon producing ideas
(theories) and empirical results useful to, and perceived as credible by, the broader
society. Hard-headed estimates of causal impacts as well as descriptive analyses,
interpreted in light of the relevant economic theory, represent fundamental con-
tributions to evidence-based policy.
We reject all substitutes for thinking seriously about the choice of applied
econometric method in light of the available data, the institutional context and the
policy question of interest. These substitutes include both hierarchies of evidence
and related magic bullet theories regarding the universal superiority of particular
identification strategies or estimators. They also include low-grade substitutes
(at least as currently operationalized) such as the performance management and
participant evaluation approaches discussed in Smith and Sweetman (2010).
Instead, we advocate for the careful selection of an applied econometric ap-
proach in light of the relevant economic theory, the available data, the institu-
tional context and the policy and/or academic question of interest. The realization
among applied researchers of the importance of heterogeneous treatment effects
and of selection by agents (and by gatekeepers) into and out of programs and
policies based on beliefs about these heterogeneous impacts has complicated this
task. Different identification strategies imply different, and sometimes quite lim-
ited, causal estimands; generalizing beyond these narrow interpretations requires
analytical care. In discussing the available identification strategies, we have high-
lighted the ways in which researchers can make the case for a causal interpretation
by marshalling knowledge of the context (particularly the institutions governing
treatment choice), along with economic theory and statistical testing. In our
view, making such explicit cases for causality remains a margin with marvellous
21 See the discussions in Heckman et al. (1999), Smith and Sweetman (2010) and Barnow and
Smith (2016) for expanded versions of these arguments.
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opportunities for improvement; in many cases, even attempting such a case would
represent an important step forward.
Finally, we view thorough cost–benefit analysis as a critical final step in pro-
gram evaluation. Such analyses represent an important bridge between academic
economics and the world of policy, both a contribution by economics to the wider
society and an advertisement of the value of our profession.
References
Abbring, J., and J. Heckman (2007) “Econometric evaluation of social programs, part
III: Distributional treatment effects, dynamic treatment effects, dynamic discrete
choice, and general equilibrium policy evaluation.” In Handbook of Econometrics,
6B, pp. 5145–303, eds. J. Heckman and E. Leamer. Amsterdam: Elsevier
Altonji, J., T. Elder, and C. Taber (2005) “Selection on observed and unobserved
variables: Assessing the effectiveness of Catholic schools,” Journal of Political
Economy 113(1), 151–84
Andersson, F., H. Holzer, J. Lane, D. Rosenblum, and J. Smith (2013) “Does
federally-funded job training work? Nonexperimental estimates of WIA training
impacts using longitudinal data on workers and firms,” NBER working paper no.
19446
Angelucci, M., and G. De Giorgi (2009) “Indirect effects of an aid program: How do
cash transfers affect ineligibles’ consumption?,” The American Economic Review
99(1), 486–508
Angrist, J. (1998) “Estimating the labour market impact of voluntary military service
using social security data on military applicants,” Econometrica 66(2), 249–88
Angrist, J., and I. Fernández-Val (2014) “ExtrapoLATE-ing: External validity and
overidentification in the LATE framework.” In Advances in Economics and
Econometrics, vol. 3, pp. 401–35, eds. D. Acemoglu, M. Arellano, and E. Dekel.
Cambridge University Press
Angrist, J., G. Imbens, and D. Rubin (1996) “Identification of causal effects using
instrumental variables,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 91(434),
444–55
Angrist, J., and J. S. Pischke (2009) Mostly Harmless Econometrics. Princeton: Princeton
University Press
Banerjee, A., and E. Duflo (2009) “The experimental approach to development
economics,” Annual Review of Economics (1), 151–78
Barnow, B. (2010) “Setting up social experiments: The good, the bad and the ugly,”
Journal for Labour Market Research 43(2), 91–105
Barnow, B., and J. Smith (2016) “Employment and training programs.” In Economics of
Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, vol. 2, forthcoming, ed.
R. Moffitt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press for NBER
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004) “How much should we trust
differences-in-differences estimates?,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1),
249–75
Bhattacharya, J., and W. Vogt (2012) “Do instrumental variables belong in propensity
scores?,” International Journal of Statistics & Economics 9(A12), 107–27
Björklund, A., and R. Moffitt (1987) “The estimation of wage and welfare gains in
self-selection models,” The Review of Economics and Statistics (69), 42–49
Black, D., J. Galdo, and J. Smith (2016) “Evaluating the regression discontinuity design
using experimental data,” unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan
900 J. Smith and A. Sweetman
Black, D., J. Joo, R. LaLonde, J. Smith, and E. Taylor (2015) “Simple tests for selection
bias: Learning more from instrumental variables,” IZA discussion paper no. 9346
Black, D., and J. Smith (2004) “How robust is the evidence on the effects of college
quality? Evidence from matching,” Journal of Econometrics 121(1), 99–124
Black, D., J. Smith, M. Berger, and B. Noel (2003) “Is the threat of reemployment
services more effective than the services themselves? Evidence from random
assignment in the UI system,” The American Economic Review 93(4), 1313–27
Blundell, R., L. Dearden, and B. Sianesi (2005) “Evaluating the effect of education on
earnings: Models, methods and results from the National Child Development
Survey,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 168 (Series A, Part 3), 473–512
Bound, J., D. Jaeger, and R. Baker (1995) “Problems with instrumental variables
estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous
explanatory variable is weak,” Journal of the American Statistical Association
90(430), 443–50
Burgess, D. (2010) “Toward a reconciliation of alternative views on the social discount
rate.” In Discount Rates for the Evaluation of Public–Private Partnerships, pp. 131–56,
eds. D. Burgess and G. Jenkins. Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press
Busso, M., J. DiNardo, and J. McCrary (2014) “New evidence on the finite sample
properties of propensity score reweighting and matching estimators,” The Review of
Economics and Statistics 96(5), 885–97
Caliendo, M., R. Mahlstedt, and O. A. Mitnik (2014) “Unobservable, but unimportant?
The influence of personality traits (and other usually unobserved variables) for the
evaluation of labor market policies,” IZA discussion paper no. 8337
Cameron, C., and D. Miller (2015) “A practitioner’s guide to cluster-robust inference,”
The Journal of Human Resources 50(2), 317–72
Card, D., and D. Hyslop (2009) “The dynamic effects of an earnings subsidy for
long-term welfare recipients: Evidence from the Self-Sufficiency Project applicant
experiment,” Journal of Econometrics 153(1), 1–20
Card, D., P. Ibarrarán, and J. M. Villa (2011) “Building in an evaluation component for
active labor market programs: A practitioner’s guide,” IZA working paper no. 6085
Card, D., and A. Krueger (1994) “Minimum wages and employment: A case study of the
fast-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania,” The American Economic Review
84(4), 772–93
Cook, T. (2008) “Waiting for life to arrive: A history of the regression-discontinuity
design in psychology, statistics and economics,” Journal of Econometrics 142(2),
636–54
Crépon, B., E. Duflo, M. Gurgand, R. Rathelot, and P. Zamora (2013) “Do labor
market policies have displacement effects? Evidence from a clustered randomized
experiment,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(2), 531–80
Crump, R., V. J. Hotz, G. Imbens, and O. Mitnik (2009) “Dealing with limited overlap in
estimation of average treatment effects,” Biometrika 96(1), 187–99
Dahlby, B. (2008) The Marginal Cost of Public Funds: Theory and Applications.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
Davidson, C., and S. Woodbury (1993) “The displacement effects of reemployment
bonus programs,” Journal of Labour Economics 11(4), 575–605
Deaton, A. (2010) “Instruments, randomization, and learning about development,”
Journal of Economic Literature 48(2), 424–55
Dehejia, R., and S. Wahba (1999) “Causal effects in nonexperimental studies:
Reevaluating the evaluation of training programs,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association 94(448), 1053–62
(2002) “Propensity score matching methods for non-experimental causal studies,”
The Review of Economics and Statistics 84(1), 151–61
Causal effects of policies 901
DiNardo, J., and D. Lee (2010) “Program evaluation and research designs.” In
Handbook of Labour Economics, vol. 4a, pp. 463–536, eds. O. Ashenfelter and
D. Card. New York: Elsevier
Djebbari, H., and J. Smith (2008) “Heterogeneous impacts in PROGRESA,” Journal of
Econometrics 145(1–2), 64–80
Dolton, P., and J. Smith (2011) “The econometric evaluation of the new deal for lone
parents,” IZA discussion paper no. 5491
Doolittle, F., and L. Traeger (1990) Implementing the National JTPA Study. New York:
Manpower Demonstration Research Corp.
Doyle, J. J. (2008) “Child protection and adult crime: Using investigator assignment
to estimate causal effects of foster care,” Journal of Political Economy 116 (4),
746–70
Ford, R., D. Gyarmati, K. Foley, D. Tattrie, and L. Jimenez (2003) Self-Sufficiency
Project (SSP) – Can Work Incentives Pay for Themselves? Final Report on the
Self-Sufficiency Project for Welfare Applicants. Social Research and Demonstration
Corporation (SRDC)
Forget, E. (2011) “The town with no poverty: The health effects of a Canadian
guaranteed annual income field experiment,” Canadian Public Policy 37(3), 283–305
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